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A Brief Introduction to Philosophy of Science as it Applies to Clinical Psychology 
Although it may seem like a strange way to begin a chapter on the philosophy of 
science, stop for a moment and imagine three intrepid explorers. Each has set out to expand 
the limits of human understanding in some respect. The first is an astronaut busy analyzing 
soil samples on the cold, dark surface of the moon. The second is a marine biologist, trying to 
find ways to get penguins more active and engaged at a large public aquarium. The third is a 
primatologist deeply interested in the courting behavior of silverback gorillas, who finds 
herself wading through a tropical forest in Central Africa. Although all three use the scientific 
method to understand a specific phenomenon, they approach their goals in very different 
ways. The fundamental questions they are interested in (e.g., what is the lunar soil comprised 
of; how can the behavior of captive penguins be changed; how do primates behave socially in 
the wild) will guide the procedures they use, the theories they generate, the types of data they 
collect, and the answers they ultimately find satisfactory.      
 In many ways clinical psychological science faces a similar situation. Although 
clinicians and researchers are united by a shared goal (to understand how human suffering can 
be alleviated and well-being promoted) they often tackle that goal in fundamentally different 
ways. Some argue that this goal can be “best” achieved by detecting and correcting the 
dysfunctional beliefs, pathological cognitive schemas, or faulty information-processing styles 
that underpin psychological suffering (e.g., Beck, 1993; Ellis & Dryden, 2007). Others 
counter that the “best” solution requires that we contact and alter the functions of internal 
events rather their particular form or frequency (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; 
Linehan, 1993; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2001). In this rich, dense jungle of clinical 
research and theorizing different traditions often find themselves in fierce competition, with 
proponents of one perspective arguing for the logical supremacy of their own procedures, 
findings, theories and therapies, while others respond with equally and strongly held 
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convictions (see Reyna, 1995 for an example). In such an environment you might ask 
yourself: is there really a “best” solution to the problem of psychological suffering? How do 
clinicians and researchers define what qualifies as “best” and is this a subjective or objective 
choice? How do they actually determine whether a given procedure, finding, theory, or 
therapy is satisfactory or even better than others?      
 Although clinical researchers do not (typically) operate in the cold vacuum of outer 
space, the water tanks of an aquarium, or the humid interiors of tropical forests, their activities 
are nevertheless carried out within a larger context that guides their scientific values and 
goals. One of the more important aspects of this context is their philosophical “worldview”. 
Worldviews specify the nature and purpose of science, causality, data, and explanation. They 
define what we consider the proper subject matter of our field, what our units of analysis will 
be, the types of theories and therapies we build and evaluate, the methodologies we construct, 
and how findings should be generated and interpreted.    
 Questions about ontology, epistemology, and axiology can seem highly abstract and 
far removed from the daily trials and tribulations that comprise clinical research or therapeutic 
practice. In what follows I aim to demonstrate how philosophical assumptions are similar to 
the air we breathe: typically invisible, integral to our daily functioning, and yet often taken for 
granted. There is no privileged place that allows you to avoid these issues: your worldview 
silently shapes how you think and act, influencing the theories, therapies, techniques, and data 
you consider convincing or valid (e.g., Babbage & Ronan, 2000; Forsyth, 2016). It dictates 
some of your moment-to-moment behavior when interacting with a client. By properly 
articulating and organizing these assumptions you gain access to a powerful method of 
determining the internal consistency of your own scientific views, and ensure that your efforts 
at knowledge development are progressive (when measured against your (clinical) scientific 
goals).  
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Scientific endeavors must have criteria to evaluate competing theoretical and 
methodological accounts if progress is to be achieved. Yet scholars often engage in debates of 
a different kind: ones that center on the legitimacy, primacy, and value of one intellectual 
tradition relative to another. Such debates have been labeled “pseudo-conflicts” given that 
they involve applying the philosophical assumptions (and thus scientific goals and values) of 
one’s own approach to the assumptions, goals, and values of others (Pepper, 1942; Hayes, 
Hayes, & Reese, 1988). For instance, behaviorally-orientated therapists may dismiss the value 
of mental mediating representations and processes such as cognitive schemas or biases given 
that such explanatory constructs are counter (or even irrelevant) to their own focus on 
manipulable contextual variables that can facilitate the prediction-and-influence of 
psychological events. Similarly, cognitively orientated researchers might view any analysis 
that omits reference to the mental machinery of the mind as merely descriptive and non-
explanatory. As Dougher (1995) notes, these respective scholars might wonder why their 
counterparts “persist in taking such outdated or plainly wrong-headed positions, why they 
persist in misrepresenting my position, and why they can’t see that both logic and data render 
their position clearly inferior” (p. 215). The failure to recognize the philosophical origins of 
these debates often leads to “frustration, sarcasm, and even ad hominem attacks on the 
intellectual or academic competence of those holding alternative positions” (p. 215). 
Psychological scientists who are capable of articulating their philosophical assumptions are 
better able to identify genuine and productive conflicts within traditions that drive theory and 
research forward, and can avoid wasting time on ‘pseudo-conflicts’ between traditions that 
tend to be degenerative in nature. In other words, appreciating the philosophical 
underpinnings of your work allows you to communicate without dogmatism or arrogance to 
those who hold different assumptions. Such flexibility is central to the theme of this book in 
helping different wings of evidence-based therapy learn to communicate across philosophical 
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divides. It is also part of why training in philosophy of science was recently added to the 
training standards for empirical clinicians by a consortium of cognitive and behavioral 
organizations (Klepac & Ronan, 2012).       
 Finally, the clinical literature is home to an overwhelming number of perspectives that 
may tempt students into adopting a vapid form of eclecticm, hoping that by mixing together 
all plausible theories and concepts, even better therapeutic outcomes are likely. Disciplined 
combinations of approaches are possible and helpful, but confusion results if theories and 
therapies are mixed in ways that are inconsistent (because underlying philosophical 
assumptions are misunderstood or ignored).       
 This chapter is divided into three sections. Part I will provide a brief introduction to 
the core topics of philosophy of science as they apply to those undergoing clinical training 
(for more extensive treatments see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015; Morris, 1988; Overton, 
2006; Guba, Lincoln, & others, 1994 among many others). In Part II, I will introduce a 
number of worldviews that were originally forwarded by Stephen Pepper in the 1940’s with a 
focus on two in particular (mechanism and contextualism). I will demonstrate how these latter 
worldviews have arguably shaped and continue to drive progress in clinical psychology. 
Finally, in Part III I consider the topics of worldview selection, evaluation, communication, 
and collaboration. If the reader then decides to adopt a particular philosophical perspective 
they will do so with awareness of the alternatives, how this decision shapes their own thinking 
and actions, and how they can interact with colleagues who see (or construct) the world in 
ways that differ from their own. 
Part I: A Brief Introduction to Philosophy of Science 
Science is broadly concerned with the development of a systematic body of knowledge 
that is tied to empirically derived evidence (e.g., Lakatos, 1978; Laudan, 1978). This system 
of knowledge is built with the intention of understanding and influencing “patterns of 
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relations among phenomena and processes of the experienced world” (Lerner & Damon, 
2006, p. 70). Philosophy of science refers to the conceptual foundation upon which this 
systematic body of knowledge is built. Rather than focusing on the particular theories, 
methods, and observations that define a scientific domain, philosophy of science is concerned 
with the scientific enterprise itself. The goal is to uncover the assumptions that are often 
implicit (or taken for granted) in scientific practice and that dictate its course (e.g., how 
science should proceed, what methods of inquiry should be used, how much confidence 
should we place in the findings generated, and the limits of the knowledge obtained). In this 
way philosophy of science provides a perspective from which we can examine and potentially 
evaluate clinical psychological science.  
Philosophical World-Views 
A philosophical worldview can be defined as the coherent set of interrelated assumptions 
that provide the pre-analytic framework that sets the stage for scientific or therapeutic activity 
(see Hayes et al., 1988; closely related terms are ‘paradigm,’ Kuhn, 1962 and ‘research 
programme,’ Lakatos, 1978). One’s worldview is a belief system that both describes and 
prescribes what data, tools, theories, therapies, participants, and findings are acceptable or 
unacceptable. The basic beliefs that make up a worldview typically revolve around the 
following set of interrelated questions, with the answers to one question constraining 
responses to the others.          
 The ontological question. Ontology is broadly concerned with the nature, origin, and 
structure of reality and “being”. In other words, what does it mean to say that something is 
real, and is it possible to study reality in an objective manner? Many ontological stances can 
and have been taken. For illustrative purposes I’ll briefly discuss positivism, post-positivism, 
and constructivism given their prominence within psychological science, although other 
perspectives than these are possible. 
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 Positivism is a reductionistic and deterministic perspective that often involves a belief in 
“naïve realism” – the idea that a discoverable reality exists that is governed by a system of 
natural laws and mechanisms. Scientific models and theories are considered useful or valid 
insofar as they increase our ability to make claims that refer to entities or relations in a mind-
independent reality (i.e., truth as correspondence). This type of “knowledge is conventionally 
summarized in the form of time- and context- free generalizations, some of which take the 
form of cause-effect laws” (Guba et al., 1994, p.109). Scientific progress itself involves the 
development of theories whose representational nature gradually converges upon a single 
reality.            
 Post-positivism agrees that a mind-independent reality is assumed to exist but can only 
be imperfectly and probabilistically understood by humans due to their biased intellectual 
abilities and the fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena. Post-positivists believe that 
there is a reality independent of perception and theories about it but are critical that humans 
can know that reality with absolute certainty (e.g., see Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). Thus 
all scientific claims about reality must be submitted to close scrutiny if we are to converge on 
an understanding of reality that is acceptable (if never perfect).    
 Constructivism, unlike positivism and post-positivism, takes a relativistic ontological 
stance. A mind-independent reality is substituted for a constructed one: reality does not exist 
independently from our perception or theories about it. Instead it is interpreted and 
constructed based on our experiences and interactions with the social, experiential, historical, 
and cultural environments in which we are embedded. Constructed realities are malleable, 
differ in their content and sophistication, and are not ‘true’ in any absolute sense of the word. 
Although Constructivists tend to acknowledge that phenomena exist they challenge the extent 
to which we can rationally know reality outside of our personal perspectives (e.g., see Blaikie, 
2007; Lincoln et al., 2011; von Glasersfeld, 2001). In some forms of this approach, there is a 
7 
 
simple refusal on pragmatic grounds to view ontological questions as answerable, useful, or 
necessary (see Hayes, 1997).         
 The epistemological question. Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is concerned 
with the acquisition and justification of knowledge (i.e., whether we do or can know anything 
as well as the validity of that knowledge and how we come to know it). It involves asking 
questions such as “how certain are we that we have accumulated knowledge” and “how can 
we distinguish this knowledge from belief”. When applied to science, ‘knowledge’ refers to 
scientific theories, explanations, and laws, while epistemology involves answering questions 
such as “in what way does evidence support a theory?” or “What does it mean to say that a 
theory is true or false” and “Is the revision and change of theory a rational or irrational 
process?”. Once again different stances can be taken. Positivism adopts a dualistic and 
objectivist position. Provided that she has access to the proper methodologies, the knower 
(scientist) can objectively view and record events as they “really are” and as they “really 
work”. This process does not influence the phenomenon of interest nor does the phenomenon 
influence the knower. Situations where the knower influences the known (or vice versa) 
represent threats to validity and strategies are implemented to reduce or eliminate potential 
sources of contamination. Post-positivism is qualified dualist/objectivist. Given the imperfect 
manner in which the world is viewed and recorded dualism is de-emphasized: observations 
are accepted as being prone to error and always open to critique. Theory is ultimately 
revisable and open to replacement by a different set of categories and relationships. However, 
objectivism is still the ‘regulatory ideal’ to which the scientist strives (Lincoln et al., 2011). 
Scientific analyses are considered to be ‘true’ or ‘valid’ insofar as they allow us to converge 
on an accurate (if imperfect) understanding of reality (i.e., truth is correspondence). Such 
analyses are based on the idea that (a) knowledge can be ‘best’ obtained through the 
identification of regularities and causal relationships between the component mechanisms that 
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constitute reality; (b) that these regularities and relationships will be easier to identify when 
the scientist and phenomenon do not contaminate one another; and that (c) the scientific 
method is the best tool we have to minimize such contamination. Thus the purpose of models 
and theories is to provide general explanations that are logically organized and that have 
clearly established links with the observable world. These explanations extend beyond the 
observation of individual events and have a heuristic and predictive function.   
 Finally, Constructivism is transactional and subjective. It argues that findings are 
obtained through the interaction of the knower and the known, and as such, are literally 
created as the scientific enterprise unfolds. In this way knowledge is subjective insofar as 
there is no objective location to view or obtain knowledge (and even if there was we have no 
way of accessing it). Thus the knower is an active participant rather than a passive observer in 
the knowledge acquisition and justification process. Truth is not correspondence with some 
underlying reality but rather the extent to which a particular analysis occasions ‘successful 
working’ or is considered ‘viable’. “To the constructivist, concepts, models, theories…are 
viable if they prove adequate in the contexts in which they were created” (von Glasersfeld, 
1995, p.4). From this perspective, science can be viewed as “a corpus of rules for effective 
action, and there is a special sense in which it could be ‘true’ if it yields the most effective 
action possible” (Skinner, 1974, p.235; also see Barnes-Holmes, 2000).   
 The axiology question. Axiology refers to the relationship between knowledge and 
human values. When applied to science it involves questions such as: “how do values relate to 
(scientific) facts? What role, if any, do the researcher’s values play in the scientific process?” 
According to positivism the scientist views reality through a ‘one-sided mirror’: objectively 
and impartially. Values and biases have no place in this process and should be prevented from 
influencing one’s activity at all costs. Implementing appropriate methodologies and 
conceptual controls ensures that scientific products are ‘value-free’. Post-positivism takes a 
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similar if qualified stance: all observations are assumed to be theory-laden. The search for 
‘absolute truth’ is abandoned and analyses are accepted as being guided by the cultural, 
social, historical, and personal expectancies the research brings with them to the enterprise 
(i.e., science is ‘value-laded’). Nevertheless, progress can be best achieved if the scientist 
does their upmost to minimize the impact of such contaminating factors on their theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings. Finally, Constructivism is dialectical: given the variable 
and personal nature of the constructed world there is no objective location from which reality 
can be independently observed or recorded. The scientist cannot be separated from their 
subject matter nor can theory be separated from practice. Thus values are considered to be an 
integral element of the interactions between and among scientist and the phenomenon they 
study.            
 The methodology question. Once the knower (scientist) has determined what can be 
known they must then identify a set of tools that are appropriate for generating that 
knowledge. Not just any methodology will suffice. For positivists methodology should be 
experimental and manipulative. A mind-independent reality that can be objectively known 
requires methodologies that can tap into such a reality free from the control of confounding 
factors. It also requires that “questions and/or hypotheses be stated in propositional form and 
subjected to empirical tests to verify them; possible confounding conditions must be carefully 
controlled (manipulated) to prevent outcomes from being improperly influenced” (Guba et al., 
1994, p.110). Post-positivists share a similar view. However, given that all measurement is 
subject to error, the researcher must engage in a process of “critical multiplism” where they 
take multiple observations and measurements (that are each subject to different types of error) 
in order to identify potential sources of error, control for them, and thus better approximate 
reality. Through independent replication the scientist learns more about the ontological 
validity of their model. This in turn enables them to engage in the falsification (rather than 
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verification) of hypotheses and theories. Constructivism challenges the idea that knowledge 
exists freely in the world and that objective measurement procedures can be designed to 
capture such a world. All information is subject to interpretation by the researcher, and as 
such, the relationship between the researcher and their subject matter is a central focus of 
methodology.          
 Philosophical assumptions are interactive. Note that questions about epistemology, 
ontology, axiology, and methodology are deeply connected with one another. “Views of the 
nature of knowledge interact with views of the nature of reality: what there is affects what can 
be known, and what we think can be known often affects what we think exists” (Thagard, 
2007, p.11). For instance, if one subscribes to the belief that there is a reality independent of 
the researcher then scientific inquiry should be conducted in a way that is objectively 
detached. This will enable them to discover “how things really are” and “how things really 
work”. This in turn requires that they identify a set of methodologies that are capable of 
reflecting objective reality in a pure or relatively uncontaminated manner. From this 
perspective questions that concern axiology (values) fall outside the realm of legitimate 
scientific inquiry.          
 Conclusion. When we clarify our philosophical assumptions we are articulating the 
set of decisions we have made prior to engaging in scientific or therapeutic practice. These 
decisions involve asking and answering questions that are not empirical but rather “pre-
analytic” in nature (e.g., “what type of knowledge do we want to accumulate and why”, “how 
will we organize and construct that system of knowledge”, “what qualifies as ‘real’ or 
‘genuine’ ‘evidence’ and how it should be interpreted”). The answers to these questions are 
the foundation upon which empirical work is carried out. Just as we need to lay a foundation 
before we can build a stable house so too do we need to lay down our philosophical 
assumptions before we can engage in scientific activity that is consistent and coherent.  
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Part II: Pepper’s Four Worldviews and Their Relation to Clinical Psychology 
Although worldviews can and have been categorized in many different ways Pepper’s 
(1942) classification scheme is useful in reflecting upon the components, assumptions, and 
concerns that drive theory and research in different areas of clinical and applied psychology. 
Pepper’s Worldviews 
The core of Pepper’s thesis was that humans are not prone to engaging in complex, 
abstract thought and that they tend to rely on commonsense guides or “root metaphors” in 
order to maintain their intellectual bearings. He argued that the major (relatively adequate) 
philosophical positions can be clustered into one of four core models or ‘world hypotheses’: 
formism, organicism, mechanism, and contextualism. Each relies on a different root metaphor 
as a kind of thumbnail guide which suggests how knowledge ought to be justified or 
represented, how new knowledge should be obtained, and how truth can be evaluated (for 
more see Berry, 1984; Hayes et al., 1988; Hayes, 1993).      
 These worldviews are autonomous (because their basic assumptions are 
incommensurable) and allow content in different domains of knowledge to be described with 
precision (i.e., applying a restricted set of principles to specific events) and scope (i.e., 
analyses that explain a comprehensive range of events across a variety of situations). Their 
truth criteria provide a way of evaluating the validity of scientific analyses that emerge from a 
particular worldview. In the following section I will consider each of these worldviews and 
then discuss how they set the stage for particular kinds of clinical research and practice.  
Formism 
Pepper’s first worldview is formism. The root metaphor of formism is the recurrence 
of recognizable forms. An easy way to think of formism is that it is a form of philosophy 
based on the action of naming: knowing how to characterize a particular event. For instance, 
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“smart phones” constitute a class or category in which many particulars are said to 
“participate”. The ‘truth’ or ‘validity’ of an analysis is based on simple correspondence: 
individual member possesses characteristics that correspond to the characteristics of the class. 
A brick is not a smart phone because it is not electronic and you cannot make calls with it; a 
desktop computer is electronic and you can make calls with it, but it is not a smart phone in 
part because it is not portable and so on. The scientist’s task is to create a comprehensive set 
of categories or names and the ‘truth’ or ‘value’ of their actions can be determined from the 
exhaustive nature of the categorical system created. “If the system has a category for all kinds 
of things, and things for all categories, then the system is deemed to correspond with the a 
priori assumed world of things and events” (Wilson, Whiteman, & Bordieri, 2013, p. 29). 
When applied to psychology, formism suggests that phenomena can be understood by 
assigning them to specific classes or types, and for that reason some nosologists or personality 
theories provide good examples of this worldview.  
Mechanism 
Mechanism is a more sophisticated variant of formism and is arguably the position 
that underpins most empirical work in contemporary psychology. The root metaphor of 
mechanism is the commonsense ‘machine.’ This approach “assumes the a priori status of 
parts, but goes on to build models involving parts, relations, and forces animating such a 
system” (Wilson et al., 2013, p.29), When applied to psychology the purpose of science is to 
identify the parts and their relationships that mediate between input (environment) and output 
(behavior) and to identify the operating conditions or forces that are necessary and sufficient 
for mechanisms to successfully function. Mechanisms can come in many different forms, 
from mental (e.g., associations or propositions), and physical (e.g., neural connections or 
chains of behavior) to environmental (e.g., a lever). So too can their operating conditions 
(e.g., ‘automaticity’ in the mental domain; presence or absence of environmental stressors on 
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neural activity; impact of gravity on a lever). Note that terms such as ‘mechanism’ and 
‘mechanistic’ have sometimes been used within applied psychology as an epithet 
meaning 'robot-like' or 'unfeeling'. This is not its meaning in philosophy of science and when I 
refer to 'mechanism' I'm doing so without any such negative connotations.   
 From a mechanistic perspective causation is contiguous: “each step in the mechanism 
can take place only if there is an immediately preceding step that puts in motion the next step” 
(De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, Chapter 6 of this volume, manuscript p. 5). 
Within psychological science, (mental) mechanisms are argued to operate under a restricted 
set of conditions and these are often separate from, but co-vary with, the environmental 
context under which behavior is observed. Thus the unit of analysis is the component element 
of the machine. Although some of these elements are directly observable in principle (e.g., 
neurons), in psychology they often are inferred from changes in behavior due to organismic 
interactions with the environment (see Bechtel, 2008).      
 Note that the root metaphor of a machine applies both to the knower and what is 
known. “The knower relates to the world by producing an internal copy of it through 
mechanical transformation. This epistemological stance preserves both the knower and the 
known intact and basically unchanged by their relation” (Hayes et al., 1988, p.99). Analyses 
are considered to be “true” or “valid” when the internal copy of reality (the hypothesized 
model or theory) maps onto the world as it is. This is a more elaborated version of the 
correspondence based truth criterion of formism. How well a particular system reflects reality 
is evaluated by the extent to which it is corroborated by other independent knowers through 
predictive verification or falsification.         
 Because complexity is viewed as being built up from parts, mechanists tend to be 
reductionistic. The goal of science is to identify the most basic units that fill the temporal gaps 
between one event and another (e.g., mental representations, past behaviors, neural activity, 
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emotions). This is achieved by building facsimiles of reality (internal copies) whose ‘truth’ or 
‘validity’ is determined from their objective correspondence with that reality (e.g., mental 
models). Description and theoretical prediction constitute satisfactory forms of scientific 
explanation given that they allow one to evaluate correspondence between theory and reality. 
The result (at least in psychology) is a largely hypothetico-deductive and theory-driven 
research agenda and one that downplays distal factors (histories of learning) and emphasizes 
behavior as the product of an internal, independent causal agents or systems.  
 Clinical implications. The most common extension of this type of thinking in clinical 
psychology is the formulation of theories and models that detail the component elements and 
operating conditions of the mental machine that mediate between environment and 
dysfunctional behavior. In either case, the source and solution to clinical problems can be 
found in the elements that comprise the system: through the addition, revision, and 
elimination of mechanisms and/or operating conditions one can impact the probability of 
clinical outcomes. Given a truth criteria based on the elaborated correspondence between the 
proposed system and reality, predictive verification of theories and therapies is considered 
essential.            
 These philosophical assumptions are inherent in many cognitive and behavioral 
therapies. For example, the impact of stimulus pairings or operant contingencies in early 
behavior therapy might be explained by the formation and revision of stimulus-response or 
stimulus-stimulus associations (e.g., see Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). Similarly, the 
impact of cognitive therapy (CT; Beck, 1993; Mahoney, 1974) might be explained by the 
cognitive schemas, faulty information-processing styles, irrational cognitions, or automatic 
thoughts that are thought to mediate the relationship between environmental input and 
behavioral/emotional output. As a result of these explanations, the target of intervention 
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would be a change in the occurrence of these events, though restructuring, reappraisal, the 
modification of core beliefs, and so on (e.g., Hofmann, 2011; see Chapter 21-22).  
Organicism 
Organicism is a third worldview forwarded by Pepper. The root metaphor adopted is 
that of the ‘growing organism’. Organic development is viewed as beginning in one form, 
growing and transitioning in an expected pattern, and then ultimately culminating in another 
form that was inherent in what came before. Consider, for example, the organic process 
through which a seed turns into a tree. There are rules of transition between states or phases, 
and stability between periods of change, but once they are identified and explained, all are 
seen as part of a single coherent process. In order to explain the present and predict the future 
we must understand the basic rules that govern development and how these rules operate 
across both time and context (Reese & Overton, 1970; Super & Harkness, 2003). 
 Organicism is teleological. Just as a seed is “meant to be” a tree, stages of 
development make sense only by knowing where they are headed. The truth criterion of 
organicism is coherence. “When a network of interrelated facts converges on a conclusion the 
coherence of this network renders this conclusion “true”. All contradictions of understanding 
originate in incomplete knowledge of the whole organic process. When the whole is known, 
the contradictions are removed and the organic whole…is found to have been implicit in the 
fragments” (Hayes et al., 1988, p.100).       
 Organicists reject the idea of simple linear ‘cause-effect’ explanations, preferring a 
more synthetic (interactional) approach. They argue that a system cannot be understood by 
breaking it down into its component elements. The whole is not a combination of individual 
parts: rather the whole is basic with parts having meaning only with regard to the whole. The 
identification of parts or stages is to some degree an arbitrary exercise for the purpose of 
investigation, but the order of those stages are not. For instance, “where the line is drawn to 
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mark the difference between an infant and a toddler may be arbitrary, but that infancy 
precedes toddlerhood is non-arbitrary and is assumed to reflect the a priori organization of 
development” (Wilson et al., 2013, p.30).  
Contextualism  
Pepper’s fourth worldview is contextualism. The root metaphor of contextualism is the 
ongoing “act-in-context”. Acts can be anything done in and with a current and historical 
context and are defined by their purpose and meaning. Contexts can “project outward 
spatially to include the entire universe….backward in time infinitely to include the remotest 
antecedent, or forward in time to include the most delayed consequence” (Hayes & 
Brownstein, 1986, p.178). The ‘act-in-context’ is not a description of some static event that 
occurred in the past. Instead it is a purposeful activity that takes place here and now within 
physical, social, and temporal contexts. Thus in contextualism (as in mechanism and 
organicism) relations and forces may be described. However, the described organization of 
those forces and relations is not assumed to reflect some a priori organization of the world (as 
is the case with formism or mechanism) nor some progression towards an ‘ideal form’ (as is 
the case with organicism). Rather speaking of parts and relations are themselves the actions of 
scientists that operate in and with their own contexts and for their own purposes (Hayes, 
1993). Consequently, scientific activity based on contextualistic thinking (within psychology) 
is not concerned with descriptions of the “real world” but rather “verbal analyses that permit 
both basic and applied researchers and practitioners to change the behavior of individuals and 
groups” (De Houwer et al., 2016b, p. 8).       
 Note that an “act-in-context” can vary from the most proximal behavioral instance 
(e.g., social anxiety as one interacts with colleagues here and now) to temporally distal and 
remote behavioral sequences (e.g., the impact of a particular experience two years ago on 
choosing whether to attend a social gathering in several days’ time). What brings order to this 
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spread of possibility is the pragmatic goal of an analyst (see Barnes-Holmes, 2000; Morris, 
1988; Wilson et al., 2013). The metric of truth is neither correspondence nor coherence with a 
mind-independent reality but simply anything that facilitates ‘successful working’ (this is the 
same truth criterion previously mentioned in the section on constructivism and indeed 
constructivists are often contextualists).        
 There are varieties of scientific contextualism, however. In order to know what 
successfully works one must know what one is working toward: there must be a clear a priori 
statement of the scientists or practitioner’s goal or intent (Hayes, 1993). Descriptive 
contextualists (e.g., dramaturgists, narrative psychologists, post-modernists, social 
constructionists) are focused on analyses that help them appreciate the participation of history 
and circumstance in the whole. In contrast, functional contextualists set out to predict-and-
influence behavior with precision, scope, and depth (Hayes, 1993). Because of this, 
contextualism is relativistic – what is considered true differs from one scientist to another 
based on their respective goals.       
 Clinical implications. Contextualism focuses the clinical researcher and practitioner 
on the meaning and purpose of a person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions in a given context. 
Humanistic psychology tends toward a descriptive contextualistic position in which therapists 
seek to appreciate the wholeness of a psychological event (Schneider, 2011). Many forms of 
modern cognitive and behavioral therapies, such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT; Hayes et al., 1999), Functional-Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; Kanter, Tsai, & 
Kohlenberg, 2010), Integrative Behavioral Couples Therapy (IBCT; Christensen & Jacobson, 
1998), and Behavioral Activation (Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001), consciously adopt 
the core of a functional contextual position. Others such as Dialectical Behavior Therapy 
(DBT; Linehan, 1993; Lynch, Chapman, Rosenthal, Kuo, & Linehan, 2006), Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2001), and Rational-Emotive Behavior 
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Therapy (Ellis & Dryden, 2007) mix the contextual perspective with elements of mechanistic 
thinking.  
ACT can be used as a brief example to help show how contextualistic thinking leads 
the scientist/practitioner down a different pathway than mechanistic perspectives. Broadly 
speaking, ACT does not focus on the content of a thought, attempt to manipulate its form or 
frequency, nor does it concern itself with the extent to which a thought is “real”. Instead it 
pays close attention to what function the thought, feeling, or behavior has for the client in a 
given context. Take the example of a public speaker who encounters the thought “I’m going 
to have a panic attack” as she walks towards a podium. An ACT therapist might not assume 
that this thought is necessarily harmful or that it has to be eradicated or revised. Rather they 
might ask “How can you relate to this thought in a way that will foster what you want?” 
 This approach is adopted because cognitions, emotions, beliefs, and dispositions are 
viewed as dependent variables (actions) and not as contiguous causes of other dependent 
variables such as overt behavior (except in a context). In order to predict-and-influence the 
relationship of, say, thoughts and overt behavior, clinicians and researchers need to identify 
the “independent variables” that can be directly manipulated in order to alter that relationship 
and - and from their perspective - only contextual variables are open to direct manipulation 
(Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Mental mechanisms (e.g., associations in memory, schemas, 
semantic networks, or propositions) and the hypothesized forces that bind them are (at best) 
more dependent variables – they are certainly not viewed as functional causes. That same 
truth criterion also applies to the client who is “encouraged to abandon any interest in the 
literal truth of their own thoughts or evaluations; and instead…embrace a passionate and 
ongoing interest in how to live according to their values” (Hayes, 2004, p. 647).  
Part III: Selection, Evaluation, and Communication between Worldviews 
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Now that we’ve encountered a number of worldviews and discussed how they inform 
clinical thinking and practice you may be asking yourself a new set of questions about 
selection, evaluation, and communication. For instance, exactly how, when, and why did you 
decide to subscribe to a particular worldview and is your belief system any better or more 
useful than that of your peers? Given their fundamental differences can proponents of one 
worldview ever communicate and interact with those who adopt another perspective? It is to 
these questions that we now turn.  
Worldview Selection  
People may find themselves adhering to a particular worldview for several reasons. 
First, their philosophical orientation (and thus theoretical predilections) may be partially 
determined by individual differences such as temperament and personality attributes (e.g., 
Babbage & Ronan, 2000; Johnson, Germer, Efran, & Overton, 1988). Second, worldviews 
may not be consciously selected but rather ‘implicitly’ thrust upon us by the prevailing 
scientific, cultural, historical, and social contexts within which we find ourselves embedded. 
In other words, scientists may assimilate or inherit the philosophical framework that 
underpins the dominant Zeitgeist of their field during their training. Thus worldview selection 
may be to some extent irrational (Pepper, 1942; Feyrabend, 2010; Kuhn, 1962; although see 
Lakatos, 1978 for arguments centered on rational research program selection). For instance, 
once prediction is implicitly adopted as a scientific aim, then (mental) mechanistic 
explanations may be simpler and viewed as ‘common sense’. If your goal is to predict-and-
influence behavior, a contextual position may seem more valuable. Third, people can evaluate 
the scientific outcomes that are produced when different worldviews are adopted and 
effectively “vote with their feet” (Hayes, 1993, p.18). The popularity of worldviews seems to 
shift across time, both within and between scientific communities (Kuhn, 1962). 
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Psychological science is no exception, with a variety of meta-theoretical paradigms, theories, 
and empirical issues gaining prominence at one time or another.  
Worldview Evaluation 
Although the selection of any particular worldview may be guided by popular 
convention, personality disposition, or matters of taste, the standards of evaluation applied to 
that worldview are specified. When we evaluate a particular product of scientific activity 
(e.g., a finding, theory, or therapy) as being either “good” or “satisfactory”, we are basically 
asking whether that activity is consistent or coherent with the internal requirements of a 
worldview, and with the consumers of new knowledge.    
 Evaluating one’s own worldview. One reason to clarify your own philosophical 
assumptions is that it allows you to evaluate your own scientific activity. For instance, if one 
adopts a positivist (realist) position, theories are “mirrors” that vary in the extent to which 
they reflect the world “as it really is”. Evaluation and progress therefore requires that 
standards be applied that lead to the development of “mirrors” that best reflect reality. For 
post-positivist (critical realists) a similar (if qualified) position is taken wherein researchers 
develop theories that are akin to “dirty mirrors” contaminated by error and bias. Standards of 
evaluation and progress involve polishing one’s theoretical mirrors so as to remove as much 
distortion in order to represent reality as closely as possible. A knowledge claim of this kind 
can best be tested by a hypothetico-deductive model of theory development in which highly 
precise predictions are extended to relatively unexplored domains (see Bechtel, 2008; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015).       
 Theory testing looks quite different if one takes a contextualistic or constructivist 
stance. In this case theories are merely tools with which to achieve some end. Consider how a 
commonsense tool, say a hammer, could be evaluated. “A hammer is a good ‘hammer’ if it 
allows the carpenter to drive a nail. It would not make sense to say that the hammer does so 
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because it accurately refers to the nail or reflects the nail” (Wilson et al., 2013, p.30). 
Similarly, a theory is considered a ‘good’ theory because it allows the scientist to achieve 
some desired outcome. In this case, theory evaluation involves determining the consistency 
with which models or theories can be shown to led to useful interventions across a range of 
situations (e.g., see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Wilson, 2012; Long, 2013).  
 Evaluating the worldview of others. When evaluating research programs based on a 
worldview other than your own it is inherently dogmatic to apply criteria that emerge from 
your own worldview. A great deal of useless and counterproductive energy has been spent 
doing so in both basic and applied psychological science. For instance, researchers and 
therapists adhering to a functional contextual perspective might question why their colleagues 
are so preoccupied with pieces of the mental machinery and their operating conditions when 
doing so may depreciate the role that histories of learning and contextual variables play in 
how thoughts lead to other actions. Mechanists may counter that contextualists are not 
interested in scientific understanding - they are mere ‘technicians’ or ‘problem solvers’ who 
manipulate the environment in order to produce changes in behavior without any appreciation 
of the mechanisms that mediate those changes.       
 What should be clear, however, is that these arguments are ‘pseudo-conflicts’ – an 
attempt by proponents of one worldview to position their own philosophical assumptions (and 
thus scientific goals and values) as ultimately right and that of others as wrong. Yet 
philosophical assumptions cannot be proven to be right or wrong because they are not the 
result of evidence – they define what is to be considered as “evidence”. The standards 
developed within a given worldview can therefore only be applied to the products that emerge 
from that approach (in much the same way that the rules that make sense within one sport 
(soccer) cannot be used to govern the activity of others (basketball)). Furthermore no 
worldview is strengthened by showing the weaknesses of other positions.   
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 There seem to be four legitimate forms of evaluation. One is to improve your own 
scientific products as measured against the criteria appropriate to your approach. A second is 
less obvious, but is professionally helpful and collegial: enter into the assumptions of 
colleagues that differ from your own and then help them improve the scientific products as 
measured against the criteria that are appropriate to those assumptions. A third is to clearly 
articulate the assumptions and purposes that underpin your scientific activity and note (non-
evaluatively) how this differs from others. For instance, you can describe the root metaphor 
and truth criterion that you’ve adopted and how your analyses are carried out from this 
perspective, without insisting that others with different assumptions do the same. A final 
approach is to note the goals and uses of science by consumers (e.g., government funders; 
patients) and to objectively assess whether research programs serve those ends. 
Communication and Collaboration between Proponents of Different Worldviews 
In light of the above, you might wonder if it’s possible for adherents of one worldview 
to communicate and collaborate with those from another without sacrificing their respective 
goals and values in the process. The received wisdom in psychology is that communication 
across worldviews is not possible. A concrete example is the way researchers use the same 
words but are referring to different concepts (e.g., “cognition” means very different things for 
mental mechanistic and functional-contextual researchers; see De Houwer et al., 2016b) or 
use different words to refer to a similar idea (e.g., ‘attentional allocation’ or ‘stimulus 
discrimination’). The most common result of these difficulties appears to be either a fight over 
perceived scientific legitimacy or a tendency to ignore the fruits of their respective labors.
 There is a radically different way to approach this situation, however, and it helps 
explain some of why training in philosophy of science has been added to the expected 
knowledge base of practitioners. If scientific goals of different worldviews are orthogonal, it 
also means they cannot be in direct conflict with one another. There is thus no reason why 
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developments within one tradition cannot be used to further the scientific agenda of the other. 
This book is organized around that core idea. Process-based therapy can be linked to evidence 
from different traditions. By appreciating legitimate differences, the different wings or waves 
of evidence-based therapy can potentially complement each other.   
 Consider the dialogue explored in Chapter 7 regarding cognition approached within a 
“Functional-Cognitive Framework” (FC) model of scientific cooperation. Psychological 
science can be conducted in two different but supportive levels of analysis - a functional level 
that aims to explain behavior in terms of elements in the environment and a cognitive level 
that aims to understand the mental mechanisms by which elements in the environment 
influence behavior. The FC framework does not interfere with the individual researcher’s 
goals, nor does it pass judgment on those goals or the reasons behind them. Instead, it seeks 
mutually supportive interaction. Research at the functional (contextual) level, for example, 
can provide knowledge about the environmental determinants of behavior – which can also be 
used to drive mental research and or to constrain mental theorizing. So long as each approach 
remains committed to its form of explanation, knowledge gained at one level can be used to 
advance progress at the other (De Houwer, 2011). This meta-theoretical framework has 
yielded benefits in several areas of research (for a recent review see Hughes, De Houwer, & 
Perugini, 2016) and there appears to be no reason not to extend it to clinical psychology and 
issues such as the differences between wings of behavioral and cognitive therapy (De 
Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016a; Chapter 7 of this volume).  
Conclusion 
The main goal of this chapter was to introduce the topic of philosophy of science as it 
applies to clinical and applied psychology. Philosophical assumptions silently shape and 
guide our scientific activity and therapeutic practice. These “assumptions or worldviews are 
like the place one stands. What one sees and does is greatly determined by the place from 
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which one views. In this way, assumptions are neither true nor false, but rather provide 
different views of different landscapes” (Ciarrochi, Robb, & Godsell, 2005, p.81). 
Appreciating the role of philosophical assumptions tempers and guides collegial interaction 
within the field, and is an important context for research evaluation, communication and 
collaboration. Philosophical assumptions make a difference, whether in the laboratory or the 
therapy room. 
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